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INTRODUCTION
Deborah Hellman and Kate Nicholson’s “Rationing
Disability”1 is a skillfully integrated analysis of the legal and
ethical challenges of avoiding disability discrimination in
setting priorities for the allocation of scarce lifesaving resources.
Their analysis goes beyond the important but narrow question
of what it means to wrongfully discriminate against people with
* Clinical Center Department of Bioethics, National Institutes of
Health, Bethesda, MD. The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely
the author’s. They do not reflect the views or policies of NIH, HHS, or the
Federal Government.
1. Deborah Hellman & Kate M. Nicholson, Rationing and Disability:
The Civil Rights and Wrongs of State Triage Protocols, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1207 (2021).
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disabilities in this context to the broader question of how to find
a principled compromise between the consequentialist goals of
public health and the potentially conflicting public value of
“equal concern and respect” for each person.2 I will focus on this
broader issue.
I agree with much of their analysis, as well as with their
conclusion that the “reserve approach” offers both a principled
and practical compromise between these deeply embedded
values.3 And until their article made me rethink the issue, I
agreed with the authors that the “probability of survival” (PS)
and “resource intensity” (RI) principles they see as presenting
close calls were equally consequentialist,4 relying to the same
extent on the tenacious appeal of the imperative to save the
most lives when all cannot be saved.
I now believe, however, that that there may be a more
plausible nonconsequentialist rationale for RI than the one
Hellman and Nicholson address. This rationale is based on the
strength of individual claims to scarce resources. I will argue
that qualified support for taking survival probability into
account can be drawn from philosophers’ proposals for balancing
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist values in settings
where individuals competing for scarce resources will derive
varying benefits from receiving them. In two respects, these
proposed compromises are more attractive that the reserve
approach. First, they do not require the allocator to decide on
the comparative weight of lives-maximizing and equal respect
in general; they take account of those competing values in ways
that are sensitive to their varying strength in choices among
claimants whose expected benefits differ to varying extents.
Second, they do not require the allocator to make special
provision for socially disadvantaged groups. They may, however,
be much harder to implement, and may constrain livesmaximizing to an unacceptable extent. But even if these
proposals do not offer practical alternatives to the reserve
approach, comparing their strengths and weaknesses reveals
considerable uncertainty about the standards used to assess
what counts as a principled compromise between

2.
3.
4.

Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1279–84.
Id. at 1261–69.
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consequentialist and non-consequentialist tenets, and,
relatedly, how clearly or felicitously public policies express the
importance of competing values.
I. DOES A GREATER PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL GIVE THE
INDIVIDUAL A STRONGER CLAIM?
Hellman and Nicholson consider and reject Joseph
Stramondo’s argument that PS is a more defensible principle
than RI,5 because although both maximize the expected number
of lives saved, PS has a further rationale: it minimizes the
probability that the scarce resource will simply go to waste,
saving no one. There is no such possibility under RI, where (it is
stipulated), the recipient will survive, even if she uses far more
of the resource than rival claimants would.6 The authors regard
this as a virtue of PS, but they note that PS can only reduce, not
eliminate, the possibility of waste, and see that concern for
waste as consequentialist in character. I agree with the former
point and suspect they are right about the latter.
But there is another nonconsequentialist rationale for PS
that is also not available for RI: an individual with a higher
probability of survival arguably has a stronger claim to the
scarce resource, not because a principle assigning it to him
would maximize lives saved, but because she has more to gain
by getting the resource and more to lose by being denied it.
Whether or not a higher probability of survival can be regarded
as a greater benefit or a greater benefit yields a stronger claim,
this rationale would not even apply to RI. An individual who
needs less of a resource to achieve the same outcome does not
herself benefit more by getting it; her individual claim is no
stronger than that of the individual who needs far more of it.
The very RI principle that would assign it to her to save more
lives would be a disingenuous basis for the individual to justify
her own, individual priority. John Taurek, who famously denied
that the numbers count, ridiculed such an attempted
justification:

5. Joseph Stramondo, Disability, Likelihood of Survival, and
Inefficiency Amidst Pandemic, BIOETHICS.NET (Apr. 6, 2020, 12:10 PM),
https://perma.cc/9MCG-Q72E.
6. Hellman, supra note 2, at 1266–68; See also Stramondo, supra note 5.
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What could there be about these strangers that might induce
[the one] to think it worth giving up his life so that they
might continue to live theirs? The usual sort of utilitarian
reasoning would be comical if it were not so
outrageous. . . . “It may not be unreasonable to think that
you yourself, were you to continue to live, might succeed in
realizing at least as favorable a balance of happiness But
here . . . is a second person. If he continues to live, he too will
accumulate a nice balance of pleasure over pain. And here is
yet a third, a fourth, and finally a fifth person. . . . It would
be most unreasonable for you to think that you could realize
in your one lifetime anything like as much happiness as we
get when we add together our five distinct favorable
balances.” Such reasoning coming from some disinterested
outside party might be a little less contemptible, but surely
not a bit less foolish.7

Taurek goes so far as to claim that there is no compelling
reason to save one person’s life to prevent a slightly lesser loss
by another. Yet even he acknowledges there may be limits to the
acceptable disparity:
There may well come a point, however, at which the
difference between what B stands to lose and C stands to lose
is such that I would spare C his loss. But in just these
situations I am inclined to think that even if the choice were
B’s he too should prefer that C be spared his loss. For some
people such a point of difference may already have been
reached in the case where B stands to lose an arm, while C
stands to lose his life. There are profoundly important
differences in attitude among people here that I do not know
how to reconcile.8

Varying survival probabilities might seem a less promising
candidate for such morally significant differences. I myself have
argued that the odds conferred by a lottery cannot be considered
a good whose distribution yields partial satisfaction of the claim
for an indivisible good.9 But consider if B and C are claimants
for a single lifesaving resource, with, respectively, 5 percent and

7. John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS.
293, 299–300, 307 (1977).
8. Id. at 302.
9. David Wasserman, Let Them Eat Chances: Probability and
Distributive Justice, 12 ECON. & PHIL. 29 (1996).
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95 percent chance of surviving if they receive it. There are, per
Taurek, likely to be profoundly important differences in
attitudes in such a case as well, but I for one think B should
prefer that C receive the resource—although, given how
desperately people cling to any chance of survival, I would not
criticize her for insisting on a coin toss. And I think a third party
might fairly assign the resource to C, as having the stronger
claim, with even less of a disparity, say, 10 percent vs. 90
percent.
Taurek’s claim about sufficiently great disparities is
reflected in a recent proposal for limited aggregation of differing
harms/benefits by Alex Voorhoeve. He argues that lesser losses
should weigh against greater ones only when an individual faced
with the lesser loss would not be morally required to incur that
loss rather than allow another individual to incur the greater
loss.10 Claims to avoid such lesser losses are “relevant” to claims
to avoid greater losses, while claims to avoid more minor losses
are not.11 Thus, if we would not expect an individual to sacrifice
an arm to save a stranger’s life, then her claim to saving an arm
would be relevant and saving some number of arms could justify
the loss of one life. On the other hand, if we would expect an
individual to endure a broken finger or headache to save a
stranger’s life, then her claim to avoid those losses would be
irrelevant, and no number of such claims could outweigh the
claim to save one life.12 Whether or not this proposal works to
consistently order losses of varying magnitude for purposes of
limited aggregation, it may provide a principled basis for giving
a scarce resource to a claimant with a probability of survival
sufficiently greater than that of any of her rivals. In such a case,
their claims would not be relevant against hers, so hers would
prevail no matter how many lesser claims there were. Note that
this is my adaptation, not part of Voorhoeve’s own proposal.
A second proposal, which would impose somewhat weaker
limits on aggregation, comes from Frances Kamm, and was

10. See Alex Voorhoeve, How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?,
125 ETHICS 64, 71 (2014).
11. See id. at 67 (explaining that a minor ailment is irrelevant in its
comparison to a greater loss because “[n]o number of claims to be rid of the
very minor harm can . . . jointly outcompete [a] claim to be saved from death”).
12. Id. at 72.
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offered specifically to avoid disability discrimination.13 Kamm
suggests that the greater benefit of saving a life of higher quality
does not yield a stronger claim if the a life of lower quality is “a
sufficiently good only option”; if, that is, an individual who could
only have a life of this lower quality if she received the resources
would make as much effort or sacrifice as much to get those
resources as she would if she could instead gain the life of higher
quality.14 Kamm’s proposal imposes a weaker constraint on
outcome-maximizing than Voorhoeve’s, since, for example, the
individual’s quality of life might be too low for her to sacrifice as
much for it as she would sacrifice for the life as high-quality that
a rival claimant would get, permitting the allocator to give the
resource to that other. But it might still be good enough that she
could not be expected to forego it so the other could gain a better
life. And if it was not, she would have a relevant claim, so that
as I have applied Voorhoeve’s proposal, the allocator could not
simply give the resource to the other claimant.
These adapted proposals would also yield similar results on
the contested issue of expected length of survival as a
consideration in allocating scarce lifesaving resources. Both
could be taken (though Kamm is reluctant to take hers) to
impose significant constraints on life-years maximization.15 An
individual could reasonably be expected to sacrifice as much to
gain a few life years, if that were her only option, as to gain a
great many. And an individual could hardly be expected, all else
equal, to give up her claim to a few remaining life years so a
stranger could have many. Although setting priorities on the
basis of length of life may be less discriminatory than setting
them on the basis of quality of life, it may still be unfair, under
either a relevant difference or sufficiently-good-only-option
proposal, e.g., to give priority to one 70-year-old over another

13. Francis M.Kamm, Disability, Discrimination, and Irrelevant Goods,
in DISABILITY AND DISADVANTAGE 260, 278–81 (Kimberley Brownlee & Adam
Cureton eds., 2009).
14. Id. at 279.
15. Kamm regards the extension to length of life as a “problematic
implication” of the sufficiently-good principle Id. at 280–81. For a discussion
of Kamm’s position and an alternative, Kantian basis for distinguishing length
from quality of life in priority setting, see Samuel J. Kerstein, Dignity,
Disability, and Lifespan, 34 J. APPLIED PHIL. 635 (2017).
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because the former is expected to live twenty-five years, the
latter only five or ten.
II. COMPARING CONSTRAINED MAXIMIZATION TO THE RESERVE
APPROACH
By limiting the use of PS to cases with a vast difference in
survival probability, both Voorhoeve’s and Kamm’s proposals, as
I have applied them, would greatly reduce the adverse impact of
a PS allocation principle on people with disabilities. They could
still yield disparate outcomes, but much smaller ones than an
unrestricted PS principle, let alone a general lives-maximizing
one. Unlike a reserve approach, though, they could not be
readily engineered to eliminate disparities. This would only be
a disadvantage, however, if “equal concern and respect”
precluded significant outcome disparities, which is a matter of
debate.16 And even if this is seen as a disadvantage, there would
be an obverse advantage: the proposed constraints on
aggregation are facially neutral; they would require no explicit
provision, either priority points or reserve set-asides, for people
with disabilities as a social group. Similarly, these proposals
would greatly reduce racial disparities in resource-assignment
while remaining race-neutral.
The strength of the individual claims of people with
disabilities and members of racial minorities could also be
increased, and disparities further reduced, by taking account of
the role of unjust policies and practices in their need for the
resource, and for the extent to which they could benefit less than
others from receiving it. These considerations became salient in
the course of the Covid pandemic: crowded housing and the
inability to isolate made members of disadvantaged groups more
likely to become infected; pre-existing conditions created or
exacerbated by poverty and poor medical care made them more
likely need lifesaving resources and less likely to benefit from
them. The higher likelihood of infection should strengthen the
claims of unfairly disadvantaged individuals to those resources;
the higher likelihood of requiring those resources but
benefitting less from them should result in even less weight
being given to their lower probability of survival or shorter

16.

Hellman & Nicholson, supra note 2, at 1262.
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expected life than to claimants whose poorer prospects were due
solely to bad luck. Both of these compensatory “boosters” would
further reduce disparities in allocation that would remain after
imposing either the relevant-difference or sufficiently-good
constraint.
A reserve system would certainly be more straightforward
to implement. It would require only a few difficult decisions:
what proportion of the scarce resources to reserve for which
groups; how to handle overlapping membership; and in what
order to process the reserves.17 In contrast, it would be
extremely difficult and controversial to establish objective,
public criteria for what constituted relevant claims or
sufficiently-good options. Setting criteria for the former would
be especially difficult, since it would be necessary to make
endless pairwise comparison between differences in claimants’
probability of survival or life expectancy. So in the end, these
may only be armchair alternatives to the more realistic
approach endorsed by Hellman and Nicholson. Still, it might be
worth trying to find a practical way to base higher priority on
the strength of individual claims—so long as it was one that
recognized differences in claim strength only when there were
very large differences in probability of survival or life
expectancy.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
A broader issue raised by Hellman and Nicholson, and by
the alternatives to the reserve approach I have suggested, is how
to compromise among competing values in policy making. How
do we assess which form of compromise is more appropriate, or
more felicitous in expressing a commitment to both values? For
example, it is not clear why Hellman and Nicholson regard it as
a significant drawback for weighted lotteries that they may give
the resource to someone with a weaker claim.18 Does the clarity
or felicity of expressing a nonconsequentialist value depend on
the outcome? If it does, isn’t this also a problem for equiprobable
lotteries among equal-strength claims? After all, the winner is
no more deserving than the losers. True, the winner is no less

17.
18.

Hellman & Nicholson, supra note 2, at 1278–79.
Hellman & Nicholson, supra note 2, at 1276.
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deserving. In contrast, the winner of a weighted lottery may be
less deserving than the losers. The more important difference
may be that while the consequentialist value is as well served
by all outcome in an equiprobable lottery, it is not as well-served
by all outcomes in a weighted lottery.19 But isn’t this prospect
part of the compromise, something the consequentialist gives up
in order to get better, if not the best, outcomes?
As my equivocation in the last paragraph makes clear, I
don’t have a settled view on how to assess compromises between
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist values. It is an
important, neglected issue in the ethics of public policy, and
Hellman and Nicholson have made a valuable contribution by
raising it in such a concrete, topical form.

19. See, for a fuller analysis, Joseph Millum, Against Weighted Lotteries
for Scarce COVID-19 Treatments, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Oct. 26,
2020), https://perma.cc/NY5W-JSFW .

